

The United Nations emblem, a world map surrounded by olive branches, is faintly visible in the background.

**JOINT CRISIS CABINETS (JCC) :
SOVIET - AFGHAN WAR**

STUDY GUIDE

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I. LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Distinguished participants and my future family members,

I, as the Presidents of Acıbadem University Model United Nations Club and Acıbadem University Model United Nations Training and Development Conference 2019, would like to welcome you all to the very first session of ACUTRAIN which will be held on 1-3 June 2019. It is more than an honor for me to be able to lead such a precious and professional team under the umbrella of newly-established ACUMUNC as, with its unprecedented campus and well-qualified members, it will be one of the most important entities in MUN community.

In this year, the delegates of General Assembly committees will be tackling the most important issues of the current world including the subjects of terrorism, ongoing disarmament of the regions that might cause a threat for the international peace and security alongside the humanitarian issues such as but not limited to the violation of human rights and aid for the refugees whose number was increased after the conflicts in the Middle Eastern region and the events that occurred because of the instability in the aforementioned region have been starting to become a threat for all Member States. Apart from the well-established GA committees, participants will have the chance to experience diverse Specialized Agencies while not only reshaping the history but also determining the future as well. With Military Committee of NATO, European Council and Organization for Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE); participants will be able to understand the administrative mechanism of these well-known organizations and to identify the functions of these organizations world politics. What is more, in spite of the fact that theme of the conference is determined as being “Training&Development”; we did not forget security-based crisis lovers. By being a part of our family, you will have the chance to feel the atmosphere in Libya within its famous civil war, alongside dealing with historical American cabinets while sitting next to JFK during Cuban Crisis and Truman establishing NATO in post-war zone. Last but not least, we will have war cabinets simulating Afghan-Soviet War. Believe me, these cabinets will be those that any of our participants have never experienced before. With the number and quality of crisis that participants are going to be faced with, they are going to be satisfied with their presence within these cabinets.

Apart from the context of the committees, whole committees will be directed in accordance to Harvard Rules of Procedure which is more delegate-centered version that allows the members of the committees to firstly discuss the content of possible resolutions and than write it jointly. Summing up, we are preparing a conference with the best academic and organizational quality. We will have numerous surprises for you within the conference process.

I am really excited to see you all in the Conference.

Yours sincerely,

Korhan KARADENIZ

President of ACUMUNC and ACUTRAIN 19'

II. LETTER FROM THE UNDER-SECRETARIES-GENERAL

Most esteemed participants,

We, the Under-Secretaries-General responsible for the JCC: Soviet-Afghan War, are more than honoured to welcome you to the first edition of Acıbadem University Model United Nations Training Conference,2019.

Since we are very delighted to be a part of ACUTRAIN family, we would like to express our gratitude to Korhan KARADENİZ for granting us in this position. We would also like to thank our deputy-secretary-general Kerem AKDAĞ and deputy-director-general Yağmur KARATAŞ for creating this prestigious conference for us. Last but probably not least, we would like to thank our crisis members Sezin Eylül ARI and Zeynep Naz COŞKUN for helping us throughout the preparation process.

During the first edition of ACUTRAIN, we will be simulating one of the most significant wars: Soviet-Afghan war. The participants of these cabinets will have the opportunity to change the course of actions while having the chance to talk on behalf of the commanders. We recommend you to not only read the study guide but also have some further research to have a good command on the agenda. Please make the necessary study about your character you will be representing during the committee. Should you have any questions, you can contact us via haluklutfuerenler@gmail.com and basaktaskiin@gmail.com

We are looking forward to meeting you!

Başak TAŞKIN & Haluk Lütfü ERENLER

Under-Secretaries-General Responsible for the Joint Crises Cabinet

III. BACKGROUND

Afghanistan had always been a country which consisted of diverse ethnic groups such as Tajiks, Hazara, Aimak, Uzbeks, Turkmen and other small groups. Mohammad Zahir Shah served as the president of Afghanistan for 40 years between the years 1933 and 1973. Then his cousin, Mohammad Daoud Khan became the new Prime Minister. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan divided into two cliques; the Khalq (Masses) clique administrated by Nur Muhammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and the Parcham (Banner) clique controlled by Babrak Karmal. Although Daoud's economic and social regulations were failed he terminated the system of monarchy. Since there were some discrepancies between the governance manner of Daoud and the PDPA, the factions reunited in the purpose of murdering Daoud Khan. After Daoud was executed with his family, Nur Muhammad Taraki, Secretary General of the PDPA, became president of the newly established Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. There were two groups on the government again, with President Taraki and Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin of the Khalq faction against Parcham leaders such as Babrak Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah. During its first 18 months of rule, the PDPA applied a Marxist-style program of reforms. Decrees setting forth changes in marriage customs and land reform were not received well by a population deeply immersed in tradition and Islam. Thousands of members of the traditional elite, the religious establishment and intelligentsia were persecuted. By mid-1978, a rebellion began in the Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan and civil war spread throughout the country. In September 1979, Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan Hafizullah Amin seized power after a palace shootout that resulted in the death of President Taraki. Over 2 months of instability overwhelmed Amin's regime as he moved against his opponents in the PDPA and the growing rebellion. ("Soviet-afghan War", 2019)

The Soviet Union (USSR) always had an essential impact on Afghan politics. A "friendship treaty" was signed between the Soviets and the Afghan government. Although this treaty seemed like a symptom of the peaceful policy between two neighbored countries, the Soviet Union took advantage of having close relations with Afghanistan. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union started to provide financial and military aid to its neighbour. Aproximety 20 years later, problems began to cause a conflict area in Afghanistan. After the president Sardar

Mohammed Daoud was murdered, the head of the Communist party, preconised one-party rule in Afghanistan by 1978. (“Soviet-afghan War”, 2019)

Since the Afghani citizens were not used to this regime, the Soviet Union supported this idea with a negotiation which claims a 20 year-period of “ friendship and cooperation”. The military assistance was also increased, and the soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev declared that military cooperation would proceed till Afghanistan have a peaceful environment. The Afghan government requested the introduction of the Soviet forces while the country was in a complicated situation due to Mujahideen groups. 15-20 helicopters, tanks, BMPs were sent to Kabul for providing security and stability in Bagram and Shindad airfields on April 14. Lieutenant Colonel A. Lomakin was the commander of the airborne battalion which arrived at the Bagram on July 7. Then larger units were requested instead of individual crews and subunits. The Afghan government proceed to their desires over the following months by December 1979. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was not consistent with sending aid and equipment to Afghanistan. (“Soviet-afghan War”, 2019)

In June of 1975, a revolution was started by fundamentalists in the Panjshir valley, north of Kabul. However, the rebels who settled in Pakistan were defeated by the government forces. The insurgents established their first centre in Pakistan to train the other members and spread the ideology of rebellion. Afterwards, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt also became the centres of rebels in which they have the opportunity of training and sheltering. Propagandas acts of sabotage, rocket attacks, cross-border firings, destruction of Afghan airspace, border restrictions, hosting Afghan insurgent groups and providing them training camps and arms depots were some of the catastrophes which performed by the U.S. (“Soviet-afghan War”, 2019)

According to the information provided by the Committee for State Security (KGB), Amin was subverting the situation in Afghanistan. A special council on Afghanistan which was consisted of KGB chairman Yuri Andropov, Ponomaryev from the Central Committee, and Dmitry Ustinov, the Minister of Defense., was established by the Soviet Union. The commission reported that Amin could be involved in communication and relation with Pakistan and China. Also, it was claimed that the former president Nur Muhammad Taraki

was murdered by two of Amin's guards by using a pillow. After these last arguments, execution of Amin was the priority of the Soviet leaders.

On December 22, tanks and other equipment were repaired to take action. Since there were a considerable amount of troops and airborne forces which landed in Kabul, the offices of the president were moved to Tajbeg Palace in case of some possible attacks. The special forces attacked governmental, military and media buildings in Kabul including the Tajbeg Presidential Palace from the Alpha Group and Zenit Group on December 27. (Image 1: "BBC NEWS | World | South Asia | Timeline: Soviet War In Afghanistan" 2019)

Since the Soviet Zenith Group destructed the communication hub, the Afghan army had lack of communication, and by the morning of December 28, Amin was executed. Finally, it was announced by the Soviet Military command at Termez that the reign of Amin was over. To the contrary of these actions, the Soviet Union claims that their policy on Afghanistan is suitable with the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness since Amin was killed due to his crimes and unloyalty to Moscow. ("Soviet-afghan War", 2019)

Marshal Sergei Sokolov entered Afghanistan with soviet ground forces and five divisions had arrived in Afghanistan within two weeks: The 105th Airborne Division in Kabul, the 66th Motorized Brigade in Herat, the 357th Motorized Rifle Division in Kandahar, the 16th Motorized Rifle Division based in northern Badakshan, and the 306th Motorized Division in the capital. In the second week, 4000 flights had been made into Kabul by soviet aircraft. ("Soviet-afghan War", 2019)

Soviet operations

The initial force entering the country included three motor rifle divisions (including the 201st), one airborne division, one separate motor rifle regiment, one separate airborne regiment, and 56th Separate Air Assault Brigade. Following the deployment, the Soviet troops were not able to establish authority outside Kabul. As much as 80 per cent of the countryside still escaped efficient government control. The initial mission, to protect cities and installations, was expanded to combat the anti-communist Mujahideen forces, primarily using Soviet reservists.

Early military reports demonstrated the difficulty which the Soviet forces encountered in fighting in mountainous terrain. The Soviet Army was not familiar with such fighting, had no counter-insurgency training, and their weaponry and military equipment, particularly armoured cars and tanks, were sometimes inadequate or vulnerable in the mountainous environment. Heavy artillery was extensively used to fight rebel forces.

The Soviets primarily used helicopters (including Mil Mi-24 *Hind* helicopter gunships) as their air attack force, regarded as the most daunting helicopter in the world, supported with fighter-bombers and ground troops, bombers, and special forces.

The inability of the Soviet Union to damage the military stalemate, gain an important number of Afghan supporters and affiliates, or in order to rebuild the Afghan Army, required the increasing direct use of its forces to fight the rebellions. Soviet soldiers often found themselves fighting against civilians because of the elusive tactics of the rebels. They repeated many of the American Vietnam failures, winning almost all of the conventional battles, but failing to control the countryside. (“Soviet-afghan War”, 2019)



Image 1

World reaction

U.S President Jimmy Carter stated that the Soviet incursion was "the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War." Carter later put an embargo on shipments of commodities such as high technology and grain to the Soviet Union from the U.S. The tensions, as well as the anxiety in the West about masses of Soviet troops being in such proximity to oil-rich regions in the Gulf, effectively brought about the final of detente.

The international diplomatic response was harsh, ranging from stern warnings to the boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. The invasion, along with other things in the region, such as the revolution in Iran, the escalating tensions between Pakistan and India, the war between Iran-Iraq, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the rise of Middle East-born terrorism against the West, contributed to making the Middle East an extraordinarily turbulent and violent region during the 1980s.

Babrak Karmal's government lacked international assistance since the beginning. The foreign ministers of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) expressed their sadness for the entrance and asked the Soviet to withdraw in the meeting in Islamabad in January 1980. The United Nations General Assembly (UN GA) voted by 104 to 18 with 18 abstentions for a resolution indicating strong deploration for the new armed intervention in Afghanistan and called for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the region. Nevertheless, this resolution was considered as illegal because of its meddling in the internal affairs of Afghanistan since only the government of Afghanistan could determine the status of Soviet troops. Many non-aligned countries such as Iraq, Syria, Lybia, Finland and India did not support the illegal resolution which was put forth by UN GA. The Non-aligned Movement itself was strictly divided between those that consider the Soviet deployment to be legal and others believing the deployment was an invasion.

An action by the United Nation Security Council was not possible since the Soviets had the right to veto, yet the UN kept passing resolutions regularly opposing the occupation of the Soviet Union. ("Soviet-afghan War", 2019)

Insurrection in Afghanistan

The Afghan resistance movement, open to assistance from the United States, China, UK, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the others, contributed to the Soviets' high military costs and

obstructed international relations. Therefore, Afghan guerillas were funded, got armed and trained mostly by Pakistan and the U.S. The U.S. saw the dispute in Afghanistan as an integral Cold War struggle, and the CIA assisted anti-Soviet forces through the Pakistani ISI, in a programme called Operation Cyclone.

The donation of American-made FIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missile systems increased aircraft losses of the Soviet Forces. Nonetheless, some field commanders like Ahmad Shah Massoud stated that the Stingers' impact was much exaggerated. In addition, while guerillas were able to fire at the aircraft landing at and taking off from airstrips and airbases, anti-missile flares limited their effectiveness.

The Afghan insurgents put chemical weapons in place. They used a poisonous substance acting as an irritant. The Afghan rebel resorted to terrorist methods as well. The Mujahideen leaders focussed on sabotage and terrorism. Over 1800 terrorist acts were recorded from 1985 to 1987. The mujahideen would launch 800 rockets per day in the border region with Pakistan. They made over 23,500 shelling attacks on government targets between April 1985 and January 1987. The mujahideen surveyed firing positions that they typically located near villages within the range of Soviet artillery posts. They put the villagers in danger of death from Soviet retaliation. The mujahideen used mine warfare heavily. Often, they would enlist the services of the local inhabitants and even children.

They systematically targeted civilian infrastructure and government installations. They focused on closing major roads, knocking out bridges, disrupting the electric power system and industrial production, destroying convoys, and attacking police stations and Soviet air bases and military installations. They assassinated PDPA members and government officials. They laid to siege small rural outposts. A bomb exploded at the building of Ministry of Education and damaged several nearby buildings in March 1982. After a short amount of time, in a few weeks, a widespread power failure darkened Kabul when a pylon on the transmission line from the Naghlu power station was blown up. In June 1982, a column of about 1000 young party members sent out to work in the Panjshir valley were ambushed within 20 miles of Kabul, with substantial loss of life. Terrorists shot down a domestic Bakhtar Airlines plane when it took off from Kandahar airport, killing all 52 people aboard on September 4, 1985.

Terrorist groups had three to five men in each. After they were charged with a mission to murder government diplomats, they busied themselves with studying their pattern of life and its details and then choosing the method of fulfilling their established mission. They practised laying mines in government accommodation or houses, shooting at automobiles, shooting out of automobiles, rigging explosive charges in transport, and using poison.

Pakistan's Special Service Group (SSG) and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were actively included in the dispute, and in cooperation with the United States Army and the CIA, Special Forces assisted the armed struggle against the Soviets.

In May 1985, the seven major rebel organisations established the Seven Party Mujahideen Alliance to regulate their military operations to the Soviet army. The groups were active in and around Kabul late in 1985, conducting operations against the communist and unleashing rocket attacks.

By mid-1987, the Soviet Union announced its withdrawal of forces. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi was elected as the head of the Interim Islamic State of Afghanistan, in an attempt to reassert its legality against the Moscow-sponsored Kabul regime. The head of the Interim Afghan Government, Mojaddedi, met with the President of the United States, George H.W. Bush, accomplishing a critical diplomatic victory for the Afghan resistance.

For peace, the defeat of the Kabul government was their solution. This confidence, sharpened by their distrust of the UN, virtually guaranteed their refusal to accept a political compromise. ("Soviet-afghan War", 2019)

International involvement and aid to the Afghan insurrection

The deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan prevented Pakistan's efforts to dominate Afghanistan by proxy. United States President Jimmy Carter accepted that "Soviet aggression" could not be viewed as an isolated event of limited geographical significance but had to be contested as a potential threat to the Persian Gulf region. The uncertain scope of the final objective of Moscow in its sudden southward plunge made the American stake in an independent Pakistan all the more critical.

After the Soviet deployment, Pakistan's military dictator General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq began accepting economic aid from the Western powers to assist the Mujahideen. The

United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom became significant financial contributors to General Zia, who, as ruler of a neighbouring country, helped by guaranteeing the Afghan resistance was well-trained and well-funded.

Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and Special Service Group now were actively included in the dispute against the Soviet Union. After Ronald Reagan was elected as the new United States President in 1981, assistance for the Mujahideen through Zia's Pakistan significantly enhanced. As a retaliation, the KHAD, under Afghan leader Mohammad Najibullah, carried out (according to the Mitrokhin archives and other sources) many operations against Pakistan, which also suffered from an influx of drugs and weaponry from Afghanistan. In the 1980s, as the front-line state in the anti-Soviet struggle, Pakistan got substantial aid from the United States and took in millions of Afghan (mostly Pashtun) refugees fleeing the Soviet invasion. Though the refugees were controlled within Pakistan's largest region, Balochistan under then-martial law ruler General Rahimuddin Khan, the influx of so many refugees into several other regions had a substantial influence on Pakistan, and its effects move on to this day. Despite this, Pakistan played an important role in the eventual withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from Afghanistan. ("Soviet-afghan War", 2019)

Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan

The toll in casualties, economic resources, and loss of support at home increasingly felt in the Soviet Union caused criticism of the invasion policy. Leonid Brezhnev died in 1982, and after two short-lived successors, Mikhail Gorbachev assumed authority in March 1985. As Gorbachev opened up the country's system, it became clearer that the Soviet Union wanted to find a face-saving way to withdraw from Afghanistan.

The government of President Karmal, established in 1980, which many identifies as a puppet regime, was mostly inefficient. It was weakened by divisions within the PDPA and the Parcham faction, and the regime's efforts to expand its base of support proved futile.

The Soviets came to consider Karmal as a failure and blamed him for the mistakes. Years later, when Karmal was not able to consolidate his government, Mikhail Gorbachev, then General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, said: "*The main reason that there has been no national consolidation so far is that Comrade Karmal is hoping to continue sitting in Kabul with our help.*"

In November 1986, former chief of the Afghan secret police (KHAD), Mohammad Najibullah, was selected as the president and a new constitution was adopted. He also introduced, in 1987, a policy of "national reconciliation," devised by experts of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and then used in other parts of the world. In spite of high expectations, the latest policy neither made the Moscow-backed Kabul regime more popular nor convinced the insurgents to negotiate with the ruling government.

Informal negotiations for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan had been underway since 1982. In 1988, the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the United States and the Soviet Union serving as guarantors, signed an agreement settling the major differences between them, known as the Geneva accords. The United Nations set up a special Mission to oversee the process. In this way, Najibullah had stabilised his political position enough to begin matching Moscow's moves toward withdrawal. On July 20, 1987, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was announced. The withdrawal of Soviet forces was planned out by the commander of the 40th Army, Lt. Gen. Boris Gromov.

Among other things, the Geneva accords identified the U.S. and Soviet non-intervention with internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan and a timetable for full Soviet withdrawal. The agreement on withdrawal held, and on February 15, 1989, the last Soviet troops departed on schedule from Afghanistan. ("Soviet-afghan War", 2019)

Official Soviet personnel strengths and casualties

Between December 25, 1979, and February 15, 1989, a total of 620,000 soldiers served with the forces in Afghanistan (though there was only 80,000-104,000 force at one time in Afghanistan). 525,000 in the Army, 90,000 with border troops and other KGB sub-units, 5,000 in independent formations of MVD Internal Troops and police. A further 21,000 personnel were with the Soviet troop contingent over the same period doing various white collar or manual jobs.

The total irrecoverable personnel losses of the Soviet Armed Forces, frontier, and internal security troops came to 14,453. Soviet Army formations, units, and HQ elements lost 13,833, KGB sub-units lost 572, MVD formations lost 28, and other ministries and departments lost 20 men. During this time, 417 servicemen were lost in action or taken as prisoners; 119 of these were later released, of whom 97 returned to the USSR, and 22 went to other countries.

There were 469,685 sick and wounded, of whom 53,753 or 11.44 per cent, were injured, wounded, or sustained concussion and 415,932 (88.56 per cent) fell sick. A high proportion of casualties were those falling ill. This was due to local climatic and sanitary conditions, which were such that acute infections spread rapidly among the troops. There were 31,080 of typhoid fever, 115,308 cases of infectious hepatitis, and 140,665 of other diseases. Of the 11,654 who were released from the army after being maimed, wounded, or contracting serious diseases, 92 per cent, or 10,751 men were left disabled. (“Soviet-afghan War”, 2019)

IV. Financial Resources

The economic situation of Afghanistan was always related to its political history. Since Afghanistan’s Prime minister Daoud Khan believed that Afghanistan would be politically shattered without any growth in the economy, he had ever requested military and economic aid from both the Soviet Union and the United States. The country was called as ‘economic Korea’, and %50 of its foreign assistance was corresponded by the Soviet Union and %30 from the U.S. between the years 1950 and 1970. One thousand two hundred miles of roads and a %25 improvement in power output were provided by 1967. Then the control of imports and export industries was gained during the reign of Daoud in 1977. The government nationalised the banks, and most of the private firms were brought under control to improve the development of the industry. The foreign aid was declined, and the donor institutions became discontented because of failed reforms and development plans, and the reign of Daoud was devastated by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan in 1978. The Soviet entered into Afghanistan, and new official aid commitments from the West ceased, thus making Afghanistan almost exclusively reliant upon the USSR for funding. Soviet funding increased, however, with annual disbursements reaching around USD 200 million. It was mentioned by an author that. “roads became more secure, and trade and humanitarian assistance that had previously travelled by pack animal [...] could now go by a truck”. Notwithstanding these improvements, a “ brain drain” was experienced since the workers and educated citizens fled to neighbouring countries. However, because of the conflict situation and violence-induced displacement, 3.5 million Afghan people were lost. The population displacement contributed a decline in productivity in the 1980s as conflict, and a poor harvest in 1982 created food insecurity. Between 1981 and 1982 there was a &95 increase in the prices and flights from Afghanistan to Europe was cancelled with the invasion of the Soviet.

Trade relations with the West were destroyed, and %50 decline occurred in total imports and exports. At the same time, the burgeoning war economy gave remote areas new infrastructure including roads, hotels and bazaars (primarily because they were on a secure supply route for the mujahedeen). The economy became divided, as it partly remains to this day, comprised of licit and illicit components, each of which was marked by a high degree of informality. The Afghan government's military and civilian spending, funded by the USSR, increased enormously during the late 1980s, making fiscal sustainability close to unachievable in the event external support was lost. Consider, for instance, that external aid made up to 70% of Afghanistan's gross national income (GNI) during this period. Defence expenditures jumped from 18% of the state budget in the mid-1980s to 60% in 1988-1989. Afghans relied on the Soviets for fuel, consumer goods and a significant proportion of their food, which was imported from the USSR on credit. (*Reliefweb.Int.* 2019)

The war in Afghanistan was the most large-scale, long and tragic of the local wars that the troops of the USSR involved. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union's economy was known as one of the most powerful economies in the world. According to international politics, the Soviet Union was high-powered and expected to be better. The war between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan had not been a substantial drain on the Soviet economy, although the costs of the war raised faster than total defence spending. Fifteen billion rubles were spent from their invasion in December 1979 through 1986. The Soviets had been able to afford the costs of the war because they had increased the commitment of troops only gradually and manpower levels had risen from 8.000 in 1980 to the present in-country strength of 120.000. The Soviets have used conservative tactics to minimise human and material losses. It was estimated that they had suffered 30.000 to 35.000 combat casualties, a third of whom died. Most of the equipment and expandables had been drawn from old stocks. The Afghan government had been required to pay for most arms and some of the economic assistance it receives from the USSR with natural gas transfers. The total value of this aid was 3.5 billion rubles. Soviet costs had been growing steadily in 1985 and 1986. Moscow spent 3 billion rubles on the conduct of the war, some 2 to 2.5per cent of total defence spending, compared with an average of 2 billion rubles over the previous five years. (Image 2: *Voxeu.org.* 2019). (*Reliefweb.Int.* 2019)




Image 2

Most of the rising cost of the war is related to Soviet air operations and resulting in higher aircraft losses. Three hundred aircraft were lost during 1984 and 1985. The replacement cost of the helicopters was estimated to had been destroyed in Afghanistan amounted to 35 percent of total Soviet military helicopter procurement in that year. These factors had more than offset the savings from the substantial reduction in ground forces combat activity that occurred in 1986 as part of the Soviet policy of turning more of the combat burden over to the Afghan army. Analysis of improvements occurring at airfields in Afghanistan suggests that they are probably intended to support new aircraft deliveries, expand logistic capabilities and improve security. The number of Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan is increasing, and air operations during 1986 exceeded those of 1985. Despite the increasing trend, the economic costs resulting from these operational developments unlikely to be of a sufficient magnitude to constitute a significant counterweight to the political and security implications the Soviets would attach to withdrawal under circumstances that could be seen as a defeat. Indeed the recent rising economic trend cost is more a reflection of determination in Moscow to counter a better-armed insurgency and thus shows a continued willingness to incur whatever burden is necessary. (*Reliefweb.Int.* 2019)

V. Members of the cabinet

SOVIET CABINET :

Leonid Brezhnev
Yuri Andropov
Konstantin Chernenko
Mikhail Gorbachev
Dmitriy Ustinov
Sergei Sokolov
Dmitry Yazov
Valentin Varennikov
Igor Rodionov
Boris Gromov
Babrak Karmal
Mohammad Njibullah
Abdul Rashid Dostum
Abdul Qadir
Shahnawaz Tanal
Mohammed Rafie

AFGHAN CABINET:

Ahmad Shah Massoud
Abdul Haq
Abdullah Azzam
Osama Bin Laden
İsmail Khan
Gulbiddin Hekmatyar
Jalaluddin Hhaqqani
Mohammad Nabi
Naqib Alikozai
Abdul Rahim Wardak
Fazal Haq Mujahid
Burhanuddin Rabbani
Michael G. Vickers
Muhammad Asif Muhsini
Abdul Ali Mazari
Assef Kandahari
Sayyid Ali Beheshti
Mosbah Sade
Mudevi Dawood
Faiz Ahmad

VI. Further Readings

The Soviet-Afghan War 1979-1989

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